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Abstract 
 
The article reflects the experiences of the author after having served as one of 
the three international judges of the Constitutional Court of BiH from 1997 to 
2002. Based on the relevant case-law of the Constitutional Court it gives a basic 
overview of the constitutional structure of BiH and analyses the position of the 
Court  vis-à-vis other institutions established under the Dayton-Agreement and 
the powers of judicial review and human rights protection based on its appellate 
jurisdiction. Moreover means of interpretation and the elements of constitutional 
doctrine elaborated through case-law as well as organisational and procedural 
matters such as the role of dissenting opinions are discussed. In conclusion the 
article reflects the role of the Constitutional Court in transition from an 
ethnically divided and war-torn society to democracy and the effective 
protection of human and minority rights.  
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Five Years of Constitutional Jurisprudence in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: A First Balance 
Joseph Marko 
 
 
1. The Dayton / Paris Agreement and its International and 
Constitutional Legal Framework 
With the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Dayton, 
Ohio on 14 December 1995,
1 a four year military conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina came to an end. This Framework Agreement, with its eleven 
Annexes in which military and civilian implementation is regulated in further 
detail, can be described as the ‘institutional’ superstructure of the ceasefire, 
with which the military ‘status quo’ of a particular moment in time was 
‘frozen’. This overwhelmingly suggested a drafting compromise of political 
goals between the warring parties.  
As a result, the independence of the so-called ‘Republika Srpska’ (RS), as 
called for in early 1992 by the functionaries of the insurgent Serbian 
Democratic Party under the leadership of Radovan Karadzic, went 
unrecognised. The RS, however, retained its institutional structure, which as a 
result of the constitution of 1992 reflected that of an independent state, and 
hence was transformed into one of the two ‘entities’ of the state of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina whose continued international legal existence was presumed. 
The other entity, the so-called ‘Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, had 
been established by means of the Washington Agreement in April 1994. This 
agreement – heavily influenced by the US administration – contained the 
international and constitutional legal foundations to bring about the end of 
the “war within a war”, i.e. the military conflict between the Croatian 
paramilitary sections of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the Bosnian 
Government Forces which had broken out in 1993. As one of the four 
documents of the Agreement, the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
2 established by means of an institutional framework and 
provisions for the territorial scope of applicability the essential groundwork 
for the subsequent Dayton Agreement. In doing so the group previously 
referred to in the constitution as “Muslims” became known as Bosniacs and 
the ‘new’ language of Bosnian was established alongside those of Serbian and 
 
1   The Dayton Agreement and all related texts maybe found in Office of the High Representative (ed.), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Essential texts (Sarajevo, 3
rd revised and updated edition, 2000). 
2   Published in Službene novine Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, br. 1/1994 (Official Journal of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 1/94), 30 March 1994. 
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Croatian. Furthermore, the Bosniacs and Croats were labelled “constituent 
peoples” of the Federation. In addition, an ethnic quota system for the 
legislative and executive and the establishment of “cantons” each with a 
Bosniac or Croatian majority population were developed after the model of 
consociational democracy in order to ensure an institutional and territorial 
equilibrium of power between these constituent peoples.  
These very same structures are to be found in Annex 4 of the Dayton 
Constitution: as such reference is made in the Preamble to “Bosniacs, Croats 
and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others) …” In accordance with 
Article IV. I, the “House of Peoples”, as the upper body of parliament consists 
of five Croats, five Bosniacs and five Serbs. In accordance with Article V, the 
Presidency consists of three members: a Bosniac, a Croat and a Serb. In 
addition there is ensured in accordance with Article V. 4. b. a proportion of 
constituent peoples in the nomination procedure for ministers and their 
deputies for the Council of Ministers as a collegiate organ.   
As a result of the classification of Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina as entities in accordance with Articles I. 1 and I. 3 
of the Constitution, the legal continuity of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as internationally recognized state out of the 1992 dissolution of 
the communist state of Yugoslavia was ensured. Not only the change of name 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in particular the weak position of the so-
called national “Institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina” under the distribution of 
power should be regarded as expressions of a balance of power and a drafting 
compromise between the warring parties. Article III. 1 states that only 
matters of foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary 
policy, international and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement and regulation 
of inter-Entity transportation are in the jurisdiction of the national organs, 
whilst the general clause of paragraph 3 of that Article provides that all 
“governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned in this 
Constitution to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina” are within the 
jurisdiction of the entities. As a result, the entire internal and external 
security as provided by both the police and military apparatus has been 
constitutionally rendered to the jurisdiction of the entities. Consequently, 
and as a result of the de facto existing ethnic separation, the national organs 
themselves cannot properly function. Parliament and the Presidency cannot 
therefore fulfil their legislative role so that the “High Representative” 
established under Annex 10 of the Agreement started - in interpreting his 
powers extensively – to promulgate legislation in the place of a Parliament 
blocked along ethnic lines.
3 
 
3    See Joseph Marko, “Friedenssicherung im 21. Jahrhundert: Bosnien und Herzegowina als 
europäische Herausforderung”, in Konrad Ginther et al. (eds.), Völker- und Europarecht: 25. 
Österreichischer Völkerrechtstag (Vienna, 2001), 55-87 and the empirical analysis of the state of 
democracy and rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina five years after Dayton. See also the recent 
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All in all it has become evident that not only as a result of the distribution 
of powers, but also the drafting compromises such as that provided by Article 
III. 2. a. which grants the entities the right “to establish special parallel 
relationships with neighbouring states consistent with the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, the Constitution does indeed 
contain strong disintegrating factors, which in practice through application by 
the same political parties which were once warring factions, become even 
more enhanced.    
The exact role of a constitutional jurisdiction in such an international and 
constitutional framework is therefore a matter of ongoing debate. From the 
comparative position, the constitution of Bosnia raises two important 
peculiarities. As a result of the constitutional acceptance of the supremacy of 
the sovereignty of the people and the ideological assumption that communist 
constitutions containing fundamental social rights represent themselves the 
highest level of human rights protection, none of the former communist states 
recognised either the concept of judicial review or the protection of 
fundamental rights by a specialised court. The sole exception to this was the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in which the constitutional document 
of 1963 provided for the establishment of a Constitutional Court. On the basis 
of a unique federalised structure, other constitutional courts were also 
established in not only the six republics and thereby also Bosnia, but also in 
the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. As a result, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina did possess a functioning constitutional tradition, albeit under a 
different ideological model, before the establishment of the Constitutional 
Court by the Dayton Agreement to which – as a second peculiarity – not only 
national but also three international judges belong.  
The following chapters not only deal with the necessary description and 
analysis of the role of the Constitutional Court as a national institution, the 
role of the judges, their constitutional powers of judicial review and of human 
rights protection
4, the relevant gaps in legal protection and the methods of 
 
analysis by Edin Sarcevic, “Verfassungsgebung und ‘konstitutives Volk’: Bosnien und Herzegovina 
zwischen Natur- und Rechtszustand”, 50 Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts (2002), 494-532.  
4    Both the so-called abstract and concrete judicial review of legislation as well as individual 
constitutional complaints are regulated in Article VI. 3. of the Constitution:  
  The Constitutional Court shall uphold this Constitution. 
a.  The Constitutional Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide any dispute that arises 
under this Constitution between the Entities or between Bosnia and Herzegovina and an Entity 
or Entities, or between institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including but not limited to: 
  • Whether an Entity’s decision to establish a special parallel relationship with a neighboring 
state is consistent with this Constitution, including provisions concerning the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
  • Whether any provision of an Entity’s constitution or law is consistent with this Constitution.  
  Disputes may be referred only by a member of the Presidency, by the Chair of the Council of 
Ministers, by the Chair or Deputy Chair of either chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly, by 
one-fourth of the members of either chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly, or by one-fourth 
of either chamber of a legislature of an Entity. 
b.  The Constitutional Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction over issues under this 
Constitution arising out of a judgment of any other court in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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interpretation as well as dogmatic doctrines developed on the basis of the 
case law of the Court, but also with the reflection and evaluation of the role 
of the Court in relation to law and politics as the main issue of constitutional 
jurisdiction under the particular circumstances of the re-construction of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state.  
2. The Institutional Position of the Court 
2.1. What is ‘the’ Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
In order to provide clarification of the institutional position of the 
Constitutional Court towards the international and other national organs, 
another preliminary question of the entire legal system as developed by the 
Dayton Agreement has to be addressed. What really is the constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and how wide is the role of the Court as provided in 
Article VI. 3 “to uphold this Constitution” (emphasis added)?  
This question raises two main issues. Firstly, how does the Dayton 
Constitution relate to the earlier version of the re-promulgated constitution of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1993?
5 S e c o n d l y ,  w h a t  i s  t h e  
relationship between Annex 4 and the other Annexes to the Agreement? Is 
solely Annex 4 to be regarded as ‘the’ constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
or does the Constitution embrace all Annexes? 
One particular matter worthy of note is that on 12 December 1995 the 
Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed a constitutional 
law on the ‘amendment’ of the constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Article 1 of which “empowers” the Republic to configure the 
internal national infrastructure in accordance with the framework of the 
peace agreement. Despite this and in a form of constitutional ‘mental 
reservation’ Article 1 paragraph (2) provides then that in the event that the 
agreement would not be ‘implemented’, the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina may declare the Dayton Agreement invalid and hence in 
 
c.  The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction over issues referred by any court in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina concerning whether a law, on whose validity its decision depends, is compatible 
with this Constitution, with the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and its Protocols, or with the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina; or concerning the 
existence of or the scope of a general rule of public international law pertinent to the court’s 
decision.  
  In addition, the Court by virtue of Article IV. 3. f. is empowered to determine in cases of an ethnic 
block veto in Parliament by means of emergency proceedings the procedural regularity of the 
legislative process. The recently approved Electoral Law, Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine, br. 
23/2001 (Official Journal of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 23/2001) granted the Court the 
competence to determine the temporary incapacity t o  h o l d  p u b l i c  o f f i c e  o f  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  
Presidency. Article 18.12(1) of this law states furthermore that the electoral rules for the Presidents 
and Vice Presidents of the entities and for the delegates of the House of Peoples of the national 
Parliament are not to be finalised until the implementation of the Court’s decision in case U 5/98. 
5   Službeni list Republike Bosne i Hercogovine, br. 5/1993 (Official Journal of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, No. 5/1993). 
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accordance with the constitution of the Republic continue as an 
internationally recognised, sovereign and independent state.
6 
In the case U 7/97 from 22 December 1997,
7 the Constitutional Court was 
called upon to determine an application by the “Croatian Party of Law 1861” 
and the similarly-named Bosnian party upon the constitutionality of the 
Dayton Agreement. The two parties had both argued without detailed 
reasoning that the Dayton Agreement violates the terms of the constitution of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the somewhat brief reasoning 
that “on the basis of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina the 
Constitutional Court is endowed with the sole task of protecting the 
Constitution” the Court dismissed the argument that the Dayton Agreement 
be examined through application of the standards of the ‘old’ constitution of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This decision is indeed correct, even 
if the Constitutional Court omitted to mention the wording of the clear 
provisions of Article XII. 1 of the Dayton Constitution, which expressly 
foresees that “this Constitution shall enter into force upon signature of the 
General Framework Agreement as a constitutional act amending and 
superseding the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” 
(emphasis added). In light of the fact that the draft text was written by US 
lawyers, the somewhat unusual formulation of “amending and superseding” 
was included with the aim of making quite clear that the Dayton Constitution 
came about in a revolutionary manner, i.e. as a result of a breach of the 
provisions of the old constitutional law on constitutional amendments.
8 As 
such, the new constitution does not merely replace the individual sections of 
the ‘old’ constitution in which it may be in conflict; rather it replaces the old 
version in its entirety. As the Dayton Agreement came into force on 14 
December, the provisions of Article XII of Annex 4 derogated from the above-
mentioned constitutional law which had itself come into force on 12 
December.  
The recurrent mention within the Dayton Agreement, such as in Articles VI. 
3, X and XII, to “this Constitution” clearly refers to Annex 4 assisting in 
answering the second question on the relationship between Annex 4 and the 
other Annexes. The main issue is the ranking within a hierarchy of norms of 
these Annexes and whether the provisions of the other Annexes might serve as 
a standard of review for the constitutional court. As for the first aspect, there 
is already contained within case U 7/97 a somewhat confusing obiter dictum 
on the matter. The Court stated that the Constitution was accepted as Annex 
4 of the Dayton Agreement, from which follows that there can be no conflict 
between this and the other Annexes. The obiter dictum is to be understood in 
such a way that the Court relied upon the theory of ‘legal unity’ of the Dayton 
 
6   Službeni list Republike Bosne i Hercogovine, br. 49/95, para. 540.  
7   Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine, br. 7/98. 
8   The constitutional amendment was thereby not taken into consideration. It was not until official 
assent was given to the international agreement that the Parliament passed the constitutional law 
referred to in the text.  
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Agreement,
9 i.e. that the Framework and all its Annexes were assigned 
constitutional status and as such – as has been clarified by later decisions to 
be analysed – the Court assumed that in the event of a nevertheless possible 
conflict of norms, such a conflict cannot be resolved with recourse to the 
argument that Annex 4 is the ‘supreme law’, but only through a harmonising 
interpretation. It follows however that the constitutional status of the other 
Annexes not only serves a systematic interpretation of Annex 4, but may also 
serve independently as a standard of control for the Court. Despite this, the 
Court and the majority of its justices remain somewhat cautious insofar as not 
only provisions of the General Framework Agreement
10 but also those of the 
other Annexes were applied in a systematic interpretation of Annex 4. In the 
third and fourth partial decisions in the case U 5/98 on the “constituent 
peoples” the Court did explicitly rely upon the provisions of Articles I and II of 
Annex 7 for Refugees and Displaced Persons, from which resulted an 
obligation incumbent upon the entities to protect others as a standard of 
review.
11 However, the wording of Article III.5. expressly referred to Annex 7 
in guaranteeing refugees and displaced persons the right “in accordance with 
Annex 7 to the General Framework Agreement, to have restored to them 
property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 
and to be compensated of any such property that cannot be restored to 
them.” 
As a result of such a constitutional understanding came also the need for the 
Court to dismiss applications rationae temporis if they would be based upon 
events taking place before the coming into force of the Dayton Agreement.
12 
In this respect the Court saw its own competences as essentially time-barred. 
Despite this, some cases do indeed refer to the continuance of matters from 
before 14 December 1995 into the time period of the Dayton Agreement,
13 as 
clearly illustrated by the above-mentioned case brought under Article III. 5 of 
the Constitution. In particular reference to the equal protection clause, the 
Court by implicitly incorporating the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court 
ruled out in the third partial decision of the case U 5/98 that “past de jure 
discrimination” through the means of an act or an omission
14 can represent a 
violation of Article II. 4 of the Constitution.   
In conclusion it may therefore be stated in respect of the jurisprudence of 
the Court that Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement represents the 
 
9   In contrast the related literature is of the opinion that on the basis of the somewhat differing make 
up of the treaty parties, that the Dayton Agreement should rather be a bundle of free-standing 
international treaties which would however be brought together by the Framework Agreement. Cf. 
Oliver Dörr, „Die Vereinbarungen von Dayton/Ohio”, 35 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1997), 129-180, 
esp. 130. 
10   Cf. the first partial decision in the case U 5/98, in Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 11/00, esp. para. 15.  
11   Cf. the third partial decision, in Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 23/00, esp. paras. 73, 79 et seq. and the 
fourth partial decision, in Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 36/00, esp. paras. 18, 20, 29, 31.  
12   Cf. esp. U 2/98, in Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 22/98.  
13   Cf. the unpublished cases of U 18/00 and U 19/01. 
14   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 23/00, para. 79 et seq.  
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‘constitutional document’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the fifteen 
international treaties for the protection of human rights listed in Annex 1 to 
Annex 4 which form directly applicable law and which require no special 
transformation procedure, represent the formal constitutional law of the 
state – just as the remaining Annexes and the General Framework Agreement. 
Despite this, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its related 
Protocols enjoy a special position over and above that of the Constitution. 
The ECHR is, as the agreements in Annex I, in accordance with Article II. 2 of 
the Constitution directly applicable law and should moreover enjoy “priority 
over all other law”. There remains however the issue of the ranking of such in 
the hierarchy of the legal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina and whether in 
the event of a conflict with the Dayton Constitution the ECHR would – in the 
words of the US Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison – retain priority as 
“paramount law of the land”. However, the Court was not yet forced to 
answer such a question, as the requests in cases of unconstitutionality of laws 
have not raised such an issue and the Court itself – in contrast to individual 
complaints under the appellate jurisdiction – did in such cases strictly limit 
itself to examination of the requests alone.
15  
From the standpoint of the rule of law it should however be critically noted 
that not only the Constitution, but also the constitutional law suffer from a 
significant lack of publicity. Even today, the Dayton Agreement including the 
Constitution has not yet been published in the Official Journal of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Moreover and in accordance with the closing provisions of the 
Framework Agreement, the text of the agreements is deemed to be equally 
authentic in the Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian and English languages, even 
though at the time of signature only “working texts”
16 did exist in the relevant 
languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
There is indeed provided by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) a 
collection of the most important documents in English, which includes the 
Dayton Agreement and all Annexes,
17 as is a brochure containing the Bosnian, 
Serb, Croatian and English texts of the Constitution, both of which 
publications are in wide use. In addition the European Convention on Human 
Rights and some of the international treaties as listed in Annex 1 of the 
Dayton Constitution have already been translated by the Council of Europe 
into the relevant local languages. Despite this, the ECHR was not published 
 
15   Cf. the as yet unpublished case U 27/00. 
16   The first High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Carl Bildt, in an introduction to a 
collection of constitutional texts: OHR (ed.), Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine, Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Sarajevo, 1996) states in this respect: “The English language version contained in this 
booklet is the agreed text contained in the Peace Agreement. The Bosniac, Serb and Croat texts do 
not have the same official status, but they do in our view represent good working documents, based 
as they are on the texts which the parties have been using themselves. A legal expert from Sarajevo 
has looked at these texts, and believes that each of them represents an accurate translation of the 
English [sic]”. 
17   OHR (ed.), Bosnia and Herzegovina. Essential texts … . 
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until 1999 in the Official Journal,
18 whilst the majority of the remaining 
international treaties remain unpublished by the same source. Even the quasi 
official publication of the English texts is no substitute for the formal official 
publication by the organs of the state. Moreover, however, the translations of 
the constitutional texts by the OHR tend to be misleading even in crucial 
sections!
19 Consequentially the Court treats solely the English version as the 
authentic text and thereby to some extent corrects misleading translations, 
not merely in cases of direct,
20 but also indirect reliance upon a certain 
provision, for example where a provision is cited.
21 Moreover, the Court itself 
has never received from the organs of Republika Srpska the edition of the 
Official Journal from 1992 in which the constitution with preamble was 
published.
22 Even today, the Official Journals from between 1992 and 1998 are 
not available for the usage of either the Court, or indeed also the OHR. The 
same applies to some items of legislation relating to the dissolved entity of 
Herzeg-Bosna which are through the terms of the Washington Agreement still 
in force. In case of the District of Brcko which was declared ‘federal’ as a 
result of arbitration, despite having had its own Official Journal since 2000, 
the district administration has been somewhat reluctant to make available to 
the Court or the OHR its own journal editions. How is a citizen to determine 
his rights, when not even the Constitutional Court may see copies of such 
laws? 
2.2. The Position of the Constitutional Court  
in Relation to other Institutions 
An expression of the General Framework Agreement as a formula compromise 
is evident in the lack of legislative agreement upon the individual Annexes 
and thereby also the competences of the various institutions as established 
through those sources in relation to each other. The Court is therefore 
presented with the issue of its own position in relation to the other 
institutions of and established by the various Annexes to the Dayton 
Agreement. 
 
18   A rather poor translation appears at Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 6/99.  
19   An example is that the Preamble to the Constitution of Republika Srpska is not actually included in 
the version published by the OHR, whilst some pages further in the same publication, the Preamble 
is however declared unconstitutional through the third partial decision in the case U 5/98.  
20   See for example, the first partial decision in case U 5/98, Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 11/00, esp. 
paras. 14-17, in which the term ‘granica’ (border) of the Constitution of the Republika Srpska for 
the demarcation of the inter-Entity boundary line was declared unconstitutional, because the 
Dayton Agreement had subsequently differentiated between the term boundary as being an inter-
Entity line and the term border which was held to be the demarcation line between states. 
21   See e.g. case U 25/00, para. 23, in which reference is made to the translation error contained 
within Article I. 2 of the Bosnian and Croat versions of the Constitution, whilst the Serbian version 
of the text had been correctly translated.   
22   Luckily this very edition of the Official Journal was found quite by chance as a result of an earlier 
mania for collecting and hoarding of the author of this article - also judge rapporteur in the case at 
hand – in his personal archives! 
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2.2.1. The Position of the Court in Relation to the  
Human Rights Chamber of Annex 6 
After all the horrific experiences of ethnic cleansing, the effective protection 
of human rights has become in accordance with Article VII of the Framework 
Agreement “of vital importance in achieving a lasting peace”. Through 
Annex 6 the Human Rights Commission consisting of the Ombudsperson and 
the Human Rights Chamber was established with its own mechanisms of legal 
protection based upon the Strasbourg model. Since the Human Rights 
Chamber of which the bench is predominantly occupied by international 
judges, is competent according to Article I of Annex 6 to decide on the 
violation of rights as guaranteed under the ECHR and those human rights 
agreements listed in the Annex to Annex 6, the question is raised how this 
competence competes with the competences of the Constitutional Court. 
Indeed the latter in accordance with Article VI. 3. b. of the Constitution 
possesses within its appellate jurisdiction responsibility for individual 
complaints, hence may decide upon a violation of a human right as 
guaranteed within the Constitution itself so that there is an overlapping of 
competences between the two organs. 
In doing so however, both organs have disadvantages to show for a rapid 
and effective legal protection. The Human Rights Chamber may deal with any 
act of a state body which violates a human right, whilst the Court is in 
accordance with Article VI. 3. b. restricted to “judgments of other courts of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina”. It is of course in relation to the procedural 
confusion on the parallel legal protection more practical for the individual to 
turn to the Human Rights Chamber, as the matter of exhaustion of all other 
legal recourse is approached by this institution in a far more relaxed manner 
than that of the Court which takes more of a formal route.
23 In contrast, if an 
individual were to feel violated in the application of a norm of the ECHR or a 
constitutional rule, the Human Rights Chamber is not in the position to 
abrogate such an item of legislation. It can only determine a violation and 
provide for compensatory damages, whilst the Court in accordance with 
Article VI. 3. c. could nullify an unconstitutional provision and through the 
provisions of Article VI. 3. b. can also decide on the merits of the case.  
The matter of how legal protection against violations of human rights has 
to be regulated is not an easy one, but following the principle of effectivity it 
can be resolved with good will of the relevant institutions. As such, in 
accordance with Article VI. 3. c. of the Constitution, the Human Rights 
Chamber, just as any other court, if it is faced with unconstitutional or ECHR-
violating rules for assessment, could refer the case to the Constitutional Court 
for control in accordance with an objective legal function of judicial review. 
Nevertheless, both organs could at least informally agree that those 
 
23   Cf. esp. Nedim Ademović, “Iscrpljivanje pravnih lijekova – princip medjunarodnog prava 
inkorporiran u pravni sistem BiH” (“Exhaustion of Legal Remedies – a Principle of International Law 
Incorporated into the Legal System of BiH”), in 7 Pravni savjetnik (2001), 50-60.  
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complaints which have already been brought before the one organ should be 
declared inadmissible by the other.  
It can be traced back to human nature that a far-reaching ‘co-operative’ 
harmonisation of the two Annexes could not be achieved; instead there came 
into existence a form of ‘institutional jealousy’, in other words, which organ 
should have priority over the other? Even before a concrete case was brought 
before the Court, informal negotiations between the two organs revealed that 
both sides claimed to be the higher organ and could therefore in effect accept 
appeals from the other. The Human Rights Chamber was for example of the 
opinion that they were established as a substitute for the lack of membership 
of the Council of Europe and the consequent membership of the ECHR of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina which would mean that they would be required to 
check the decisions of the national constitutional court. On the other hand, 
the Constitutional Court presented itself as ‘Guardian of the Constitution’ and 
thereby as highest organ, decisions of which could not be put into question, 
provided that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not ratify the ECHR and in doing so 
subject the entire national system to the supranational jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights. The Human Rights Chamber cannot 
therefore be a supranational court; rather would on the equality of ranking of 
the Annexes be an organ sui generis beside the Constitutional Court, or would 
in the sense of the wording of Article VI. 3. b. of the Constitution, just as 
“any other court in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, rank even under that of the 
Constitutional Court.  
During 1998, the Constitutional Court received several constitutional 
complaints against decisions of the Human Rights Chamber, so that the matter 
of their concurrent relationship became an issue the Court could no longer 
circumvent, as it had done in the cases U 3/98 and U 4/98.
24 In the several 
cases decided on the same day of U 7/98 to U 11/98
25, the wording in the 
reasoning rendered by the Court for the dismissal of the applications is in 
each case almost identical. On the basis of the above-mentioned obiter 
dictum on the ‘legal unity’ of the Annexes of the Dayton Agreement and the 
provisions in Annexes 4 and 6 which declare the decisions of the relevant 
organs to be “final and binding”, the majority of the Court relied on the equal 
ranking theory and concluded that upon agreement of the treaties, the treaty 
parties could not have had the intention that each body be granted with the 
competence to review the decision of the other. Furthermore, the Human 
Rights Chamber had indeed been endowed with judicial functions in relation 
to the protection of human rights, but that from an organisational standpoint 
the organ had not been established as a court; rather on the basis of its 
transitional character in the field of human rights should be regarded as an 
institution sui generis with a five year mandate. Moreover, the Chamber was 
not a Bosnian institution in the sense of Article VI. 3. b. and c. of the 
 
24   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 22/98. 
25   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 9/99. 
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Constitution and was therefore explicitly prevented from referring a case to 
the Constitutional Court for concrete judicial review. The ‘transition phase’ 
was also used by the Court as an explanation for the existing procedural legal 
uncertainty for the individual. It was also stated that after the transitional 
period, the competences of the Human Rights Chamber would be transferred 
to the Bosnian institutions, with the result that the parallel system come to 
an end.  
Indeed it was on the original initiative of the Human Rights Chamber, the 
OHR and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe that in 2000 there 
began intensive negotiations towards a so-called merger of the two organs 
which resulted in the production of a draft law on the issue.
26 Just before the 
mandate of the Human Rights Chamber was due to expire at the end of 2000, 
the mandate was extended in a surprise move in the form of a parallel action 
by the treaty parties to Annex 6 for a further three years, at which point the 
negotiations for the merger suddenly came to a halt. It is however to be noted 
that the five year mandate of the Constitutional Court ended in May 2002 and 
that the judges appointed under Article VI. 1. c. of the Constitution may not 
be re-appointed. As in the meantime only two of the original elected local 
judges gave up their post and were replaced by newly elected judges, a total 
of seven of the nine judges which included the three international judges 
must therefore be replaced.
27 It is therefore clear, from the view of the 
judges of the Human Rights Chamber why they had little interest in a rapid 
fusion of the two institutions.  
2.2.2. The Position of the Court in Relation to the  
Real Property Claims Commission of Annex 7 
After the decisions relating to the possibility of appeal against decisions of the 
Human Rights Chamber to a great extent clarified the relationship of the 
Court to the other institutions established through the Annexes, the Court in 
cases U 21/01
28 and U 32/01
29 rejected appeals against decisions of the Real 
Property Claims Commission (CRPC) under Annex 7. This organ determines 
applications for restitution of property and residence rights in cases where 
since 1 April 1992 – the beginning of the conflict – such property has not 
voluntarily been sold or such rights otherwise voluntarily been transferred to 
others.  
 
26   Cf. Draft from 23 October 2001 [CDL-INF (2001) 20]: “Proposal for a Law on the Merger of the 
Human Rights Chamber and the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, approved at the 
48
th Plenary Meeting of the Venice Commission, Venice, 19/20 October 2001, at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL-INF(2001)020-e.asp.  
27   The institutional logic of this provision is however unclear. In practice, this would mean a 
completely new beginning, more than likely after a long pause after the expiry of the mandate of 
the first bench of judges, as the relevant organs responsible for such matters appear largely not to 
have made timely preparations for the nomination of new judges.  
28   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 25/01. 
29   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 27/01. 
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In contrast to the reasoning in the decisions relating to the Human Rights 
Chamber, the Constitutional Court on the basis of the specific legal and 
factual situation opened for itself a back door and declared – again in contrast 
to the usually concise and authoritative reasoning – far and wide
30 that for the 
clarification of specific matters excluded by the CRPC it would be possible or 
even necessary to ensure access to lower courts and thereby winning also 
access to the Constitutional Court under its appellate jurisdiction.  
2.2.3. The Position of the Court in Relation to the  
High Representative of Annex 10 
Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement provides for the establishment of a High 
Representative, the task of whom is to ensure the observation and 
encouragement of civilian implementation for the peace agreement.
31 Of 
particular significance for the relationship of this organ to the Constitutional 
Court is that the provisions of Article V from Annex 10, describe the position 
of the High Representative as a “final authority in theatre regarding 
interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace 
settlement”. On the basis of this provision, further significant far-reaching 
competences were granted at the Bonn Conference of the so-called Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC),
32 in particular the power to approve legislation 
and to dismiss civil servants who do not heed the terms of the peace 
agreement.
33 Both the High Representatives, Carlos Westendorp and Wolfgang 
Petritsch, have put such powers to ever-increasing significant use; so much so 
that the relevant literature has begun to speak of a quasi protectorate.
34 
The question may therefore at this point be raised whether the High 
Representative - politically responsible vis-à-vis the ‘International 
Community’ represented by the PIC - is also legally responsible or not, 
 
30   In this respect there appear to be two main positions that have been adopted by the judiciary of the 
Court, including the international judges. Some judges assume that the Court is to determine 
matters authoritatively and therefore with a somewhat brusque reasoning thereby avoiding any 
obiter dicta, whereas other judges are of the opinion that the Constitutional Court should also 
provide an educational function in particular in relation to those lawyers arguing before it. As such 
and with the financial support of the Vienna Chamber of Advocates, the Constitutional Court with 
the co-operation of the European Training Centre for Democracy and Human Rights in Graz held in 
2001 a unique seminar for Bosnian-Herzegovinan advocates on the competences of the 
Constitutional Court.   
31    Cf. Gianni La Ferrara, “Experimenting Internationally Managed Conflict Resolution in a Divided 
Society”, in European Commission for Democracy through Law (ed.), Societies in Conflict: the 
Contribution of Law and Democracy in Conflict Resolution (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2000), 
184-196. 
32   The Bonn Conference of the Peace Implementation Council brought together the contact group from 
the Yugoslavia Conference (USA, France, Great Britain, Germany, Russia and Italy) and those states 
who had participated in the peace conference in Lancaster House on 9 December 1995.  
33   The so-called ‘Bonn powers’ can be found in OHR (ed.), Bosnia and Herzegovina. Essential texts …, 
(Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 1997), Point XI. 2, 199,  
34   Cf. Manfred Nowak, “Menschenrechtsschutz als Voraussetzung für den dauerhaften Frieden in BiH”, 
in Ginther et al., Völker- und Europarecht …, 95; Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum and Marcus Mack, 
„Multiethnischer Föderalismus in Bosnien-Herzegowina”, in Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum (ed.), 
Europäischer Föderalismus. Supranationaler, subnationaler und multiethnischer Föderalismus in 
Europa (Berlin, 2000), 116, which makes reference to a “subsidäres de-facto Protektorat”.  
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thereby possibly infringing the rule of law principle enshrined in Article I. 2. 
of the Constitution of BiH. Hence there is the pertinent issue of whether not 
only the legislation as approved and published in the Official Journal by the 
High Representative, but also any dismissal of functionaries may be 
challenged before the Court. Through its decision in case U 9/00,
35 in which 
the constitutionality of the law on the state border service was at issue, the 
Court attempted to solve the political and constitutional dilemma that the 
inroads taken by the High Representative into the legal system of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were in fact necessary in the interests of political efficiency to 
counterbalance an obstructionist policy lead by the nationalist elites, but to 
the extent that these could then be subject to review or even be repealed by 
a state organ such review or repeal could then limit the political authority of 
the High Representative. 
The attempt to square the circle was evident in the reasoning of the 
judgement as far as the power of the Constitutional Court is concerned to 
review the law on the state border service as adopted by the High 
Representative. On the one hand the Court declared that the international 
law foundations of the competences of the High Representative and their 
exercise are not subject to review, but, at the same time, the Court 
developed a theory of ‘functional duality’ and ‘substitution’ in order to be 
able to review the law in question. In doing so it was asserted that the High 
Representative actually intervenes into another legal system, namely the 
constitutional system of BiH, by acting on behalf of the state institution which 
was responsible for the adoption of laws, namely the Parliament of BiH. In 
effect, the High Representative’s ‘decision’ as published in the Official 
Gazette is to be formally regarded as an item of legislation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. However, as all legislation is subject to review by the Court in 
accordance with Article VI. 3. a. of the Constitution, the Court declared in 
conclusion: “The competence of the Constitutional Court to examine the 
conformity with the Constitution of the Law on State Border Service enacted 
by the High Representative acting as an institution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is thus based on Article VI. 3. a. of the Constitution. Consequently the request 
is admissible” (emphasis added). 
Quite apart from the contradictory logic in the reasoning in which firstly 
the exercise of competences was declared non-reviewable, yet secondly that 
the legislative acts as part of the very exercise of the Bonn powers would be 
subject to constitutional review, this decision introduced a limitation of the 
jurisdiction of the High Representative which has since been upheld by cases 
U 16/00,
36 U 25/00
37 and U 26/01
38 and also developed into a system of checks 
 
35   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 1/01. 
36   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 13/01. 
37   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 17/01. 
38   This case concerned an item of ‘legislation’ by the High Representative which created a new State 
Court. Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 29/00. Again this law on the State Court was brought before the 
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and balances between the High Representative and the Constitutional Court. 
However, the entire system was based upon the tacit consensus between the 
Court and the High Representative that the Court in exercising its power to 
review all legislative acts whomever they will emanate from will always 
confirm the merits of his legislation as can be seen from those judgments. 
Significantly more problematic was the application of the theory of 
functional dualism and substitution in cases relating to dismissals of 
individuals in public office by the High Representative. The first case was 
brought before the Court only in 2001. It was decided by the High 
Representative on 23 February 2001 “to remove Mr. Edhem Bicakcic from his 
position of General Manager of the company Elektroprivreda and bar him from 
holding any official, elective or appointive public office unless or until such 
time as I may, by further Decision, expressly authorise him to hold the 
same.”
39 This decision was based upon the reasoning that during his period of 
office as Prime Minister of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – before 
he had become General Manager of that company - Bicakcic had abused his 
position and in doing so had endangered the effective enforcement of the 
peace agreement. The complaint submitted by not only Bicakcic, but also 
some 37 members of parliament of the Federation represented the first 
attempt to submit the power of dismissal to judicial examination.  
The Constitutional Court could have simply accepted on the basis of the 
theory of functional dualism that the High Representative ‘substituted’ either 
the management board of the public enterprise or even the High Court of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In doing so the Court could have 
dismissed the case then on the merely procedural basis that not all legal 
remedies had been exhausted as required under the Court’s Rules of 
Procedure thereby ‘avoiding’ the conflict with the High Representative. 
Instead, a rather more formalistic decision in case 37/01
40 was achieved. The 
Court stated that not only the application of the parliamentarians but also the 
individual complaint had to be dismissed on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction 
of the Court with the weak justification that the decision complained against 
did not represent a judgment in the sense of Article VI. 3. b. of the 
Constitution. Moreover, the parliamentarians would not be empowered to 
bring such a complaint under that paragraph and furthermore that their 
application did not fall within the scope of applicability of judicial review of 
legislation in the sense of Article VI. 3. a. of the Constitution.  
Hence, after the two steps forwards, the Court took one large step back in 
the development of a democratic system with a proper separation of powers 
in relation to international institutions.  
 
Court, but the Court declared it to be in conformity with the Constitution. Cf. Službeni glasnik BiH, 
br. 4/02. Despite this, the new State Court has not yet come into being.  
39   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 9/01. 
40   This decision of 2 November 2001 has not been published. 
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2.2.4. The Position of the Court in Relation to the  
Electoral Commission of Annex 3 
The decision in case U 40/00
41 came to a similarly formalistic conclusion, in 
which an application by a then member of the Presidency, Ante Jelavic, 
disputing the constitutionality of the electoral rules as adopted on the basis of 
Annex 3 of the Dayton Agreement by the OSCE Provisional Election 
Commission was rejected with the rather lukewarm reasoning that the 
Election Commission of Annex 3 was not an “Institution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”. As the Court to some extent relied upon its past case law – and 
in particular on case U 9/00 – it was necessary to distinguish this case from 
others. The difference was stated to be that in adopting electoral rules, the 
Election Commission did not replace the national legislative body; rather such 
powers of the Election Commission emanated from Article III of Annex 3 
directly. However, the Court attempted through the means of obiter dictum 
to prevent the floodgates from opening in that on the one hand the 
transitional character of such provisions were emphasised, yet at the same 
time the necessity of constitutional protection in matters of democratic 
elections were enhanced by the drafting and approval of an Electoral Law 
which would then be entirely subject to the full judicial control of the 
Constitutional Court.  
In the further case U 41/00, the Serbian Radical Party of Republika Srpska 
had challenged the decision to exclude them from local elections of April 2000 
and the general elections of November 2000. The application could 
nevertheless be removed from the list of cases of the Court, as it became 
evident in the proceedings that the party had already submitted an 
application to the Human Rights Chamber which rendered the case 
inadmissible according to the practice of the Court. It remained problematic 
that the Human Rights Chamber had however declared the same cases 
CH/98/230 and CH/98/231 inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction.  
2.2.5. The Position of the Court in Relation to the  
Entity Constitutional Courts  
Despite the existence of a clear hierarchy within the legal system which 
renders by virtue of Article VI. 3. a. the constitutions of the entities inferior 
to that of the Dayton Constititution, it has been voiced in particular by 
members of the Constitutional Court of Republika Srpska that judgments of 
the entity constitutional courts should not be subject to review or challenge 
before the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina as judgements in 
the sense of Article VI. 3. b, the reason being that the constitution of 
Republika Srpska declares judgments of its constitutional court as final and 
binding.
42 In cases U 5/99
43 and U 39/00
44 the Constitutional Court put an end 
 
41   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 13/01. 
42    Cf. Rajko Kuzmanovic and Miodrag Simovic, Ustavni sud Republike Srpske i zastita ustavnosti i 
zakonitosti (The Constitutional Court of Republika Srpska and the Protection of Constitutionality 
and Legality) (Banja Luka, 1999), 58. See also the contributions of the judges of the Constitutional 
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to such claims with the argument that not only are the constitutional courts 
of the entities parts of the legal systems of the entities and therefore fall 
clearly under the term “judgment of any other court in BiH” in the sense of 
Article VI. 3. b., but that also the effectiveness of the Constitutional Court of 
BiH would be severely limited if it were possible not to challenge the 
decisions of the constitutional courts of the entities before the Court for the 
purposes of ensuring adherence to the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Despite this, the Court emphasised in case U 5/99 that its only standards of 
control were the ECHR and the Dayton Constitution, rather than the 
constitutions of the entities.
45   
Judicial review in line with the standards of the entity constitutions is 
therefore the sole competence of the constitutional courts of the entities. 
The rejection of the submission of the representatives of Republika Srpska 
that the non-reviewability of the decisions of the constitutional court of 
Republika Srpska should be regarded as an expression of sovereignty and 
independence of the RS legal system bases itself on the one hand on the clear 
wording of the ‘supremacy clause’of Article III. 3. b., whilst on the other hand 
an attempt was also made to ensure the ‘relative constitutional autonomy’ of 
the entities. Already in the first partial decision to the case U 5/98, the Court 
had relied upon such doctrine and in doing so upheld the far-reaching human 
rights catalogue – which included social rights – of the RS constitution, with 
the justification that not every difference necessarily means a conflict with 
the Dayton Constitution.
46 It is therefore neither sovereignty nor separation, 
but rather autonomy and integration which are the key elements unspoken 
yet followed by the Court.
47  
3. Court Powers and the Extent of Legal Protection 
Already the first clause of Article VI. 3. of the Constitution: “The 
Constitutional Court shall uphold this Constitution” raises the concrete issue 
of whether this is of a free standing normative nature or whether it should be 
understood as a ‘Preamble’ to the following competences of abstract review 
of constitutionality of legislation as referred in Article VI. 3. a., of the 
 
Court of Republika Srpska, Rajko Kuzmanovic, Miodrag Simovic und Marko Rajcevic as part of the 
Round Table in Sarajevo on 29 November 1999 and in Teslic on 8-9 December 2000 on the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court and the provisions of Article VI. 3. b. of the Constitution, in 
Okrugli stolovi Ustavnog suda BiH (Sarajevo, 2001), 64–68, 164–176 and 182–190. 
43   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 3/00 
44   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 24/01 
45   See also fourth partial decision of case U 5/98, Sluzbani glasnik BiH, br. 36/00, para. 39: “Nor is the 
RS Constitution a standard of control. The Constitutional Court of BiH thereby carefully observes the 
competence of the Constitutional Court of RS.” 
46   Cf. First partial decision in case U 5/98, Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 11/00, paras. 31 et seq. 
47   An international conference bringing together representatives from other European constitutional 
courts was organised by the Court on this matter. See Joseph Marko, “Relations between 
Constitutional Courts and Other Jurisdictions in Federal States”, in Ustavni sud BiH (Constitutional 
Court of BiH, ed.), Odnosi izmedju ustavnih sudova i drugih sudskih instanci (Relations between 
constitutional courts and other judicial instances) (Sarajevo, 2001), 83-93 with particular reference 
to the US Supreme Court landmark case Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816).  
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“appellate jurisdiction” under Article VI. 3. b. and of the concrete judicial 
review of Article VI. 3. c.
48   
The Court – reminiscent of the famous controversy between Hans Kelsen 
and Carl Schmitt
49 - took from these provision not only its role of ‘Guardian of 
the Constitution’ but also an understanding of the task of interpreting its 
powers as part of a comprehensive system of legal protection since the text of 
the Dayton Constitution contained some inconsistencies on this matter; in 
addition that provision should be regarded in conjunction with Article I. 2. of 
the Constitution as an expression of the rule of law principle.  
As the Court began its task, the extent to which the appellate jurisdiction 
would include not only judicial decisions, but also those of the administration 
was however still a matter of debate. It was argued by a minority of the 
judges who preferred a limitation of the powers of the national constitutional 
court that in order not to hinder the constitutional, legislative and executive 
scope of discretion of the entities, a strictly formalistic interpretation of 
Article VI. 3. b. should reign with the result that only “judgments” of “courts” 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be subject to examination by the 
Constitutional Court.
50 This problem is however minimized by the fact that in 
both entities at the conclusion of some, but not all administrative acts, the 
opportunity exists to commence judicial proceedings against those acts. In 
cases where the respective statute did not provide an opportunity to 
commence judicial proceedings, the Constitutional Court was therefore 
required according to Article 6 ECHR to determine whether there was a 
violation of the right of access to a court after such judicial rulings of 
inadmissibility.
51 On the basis of the votes of the international judges, the 
Court – to the chagrin of the minority of the Court from the entity concerned – 
in several cases and with reference to Strasbourg case-law which had Austria 
required to change its legal system held that there had indeed been a 
violation of Article 6 ECHR.  
Despite this it has been long clear that a “judgment of a court” in relation 
to the provisions of the Constitutional Court’s rules of procedure requires an 
exhaustion of legal remedies so that those are closing judgments of 
 
48   See above, Fn 4. 
49   Carl  Schmitt,  Der Hüter der Verfassung (Tübingen, 1931); Hans Kelsen, Wer soll der Hüter der 
Verfassung sein? (Berlin-Grünewald, 1931). Cf. esp. Wolfgang Mantl, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, 
“Ideologiekritik und Demokratiktheorie bei Hans Kelsen” in Beiheft 4, Rechtstheorie (1982), 185-
199. It is interesting to note in this respect that the successor to Arsovic, the judge who retired 
during the case U 5/98 (see section 5. below), Judge Snjezana Savic as elected by the Parliament of 
Republika Srpska, was appointed Professor at the Law Faculty of Banja Luka in the field of Theory of 
Law and State on the basis of her thesis on the legal theory of Hans Kelsen entitled: “Pojam prava 
kao normativnog poretka – prilog kritici Kelsenove normativne doctrine”, (Banja Luka, 1993).  
50   It was in this manner that case U 3/96, Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 5/98, one of the first applications 
to the Court was dismissed, not for rationae temporis, nor for sufficient standing, but rather 
through the reasoning that the Court was principally not empowered to hear applications against 
administrative acts from the entities.   
51   Cf. U 7/99, Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 3/00. 
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proceedings of a civil, criminal or administrative judicial nature. In a highly 
political delicate decision concerning the introduction of criminal 
investigations against the former Prime Minster of the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Edhem Bicakcic, the Court, however, interfered with a 
small majority of votes against the two international judges
52 through the 
means of an interlocutory decision in the pre-case hearings and declared the 
Supreme Court of the Federation incapable of hearing the case and hence 
transferred the proceedings to the Cantonal Court of Sarajevo.
53  
In contrast to its position as contained within the old state constitution, in 
which the Court was empowered in the communist tradition to ex officio 
admit cases of judicial review and determine the constitutionality of certain 
provisions, yet did not possess the power to abrogate those provisions found 
to be unconstitutional,
54 it is not expressly foreseen in provisions of the 
Dayton Constitution that it may ex-officio commence judicial proceedings. As 
such, the Court may only hear an abstract judicial review case under Article 
VI. 3. a. upon request of the relevant local officials enumerated in this 
provision, whilst Article VI. 3. c. provides that any court may petition the 
Constitutional Court as to whether in the case at hand the legislative 
provisions are in line with either the constitution or the ECHR. Despite this a 
subjective right to proceedings is not, according to the majority opinion of 
the Court, available to the parties in actual concrete cases. This would be no 
longer relevant in the systematic context of Article VI. 3. b., as the parties to 
the proceedings have the right to appeal and could therefore as a last resort 
challenge the constitutionality of the legislation in the judgments of the lower 
courts. It is this very opportunity to not only declare the judgment 
unconstitutional, but also repeal or nullify the law upon which it was based 
which was nevertheless rejected by the majority of the judges. The Austrian 
model which prefers the introduction of an interlocutory decision and the 
transferral of the case to a matter for judicial review was rejected on the 
basis that the Court is not entitled ex-officio to commence judicial review 
procedures. Does this mean in conclusion that in proceedings the Court itself 
may be obliged to apply unconstitutional legislation?   
The Court has not yet dealt with this problem directly, but has in a handful 
of cases in which the issue was evident at least declared the relevant 
judgments of the highest entity courts inconsistent with provisions of the 
ECHR and have recommitted such matter for fresh proceedings.
55 This has 
been on the basis of the argument of one of the three international judges 
 
52   Only two of the three international judges were present in this case. 
53   See U 34/01, Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 20/01 and the dissenting opinions of Judges Danelius, Marko 
and Omeragic.  
54   See Amra Huseinbasic, “Ustavni sudovi u Bosni i Hercegovini i zastita ljudskih prava” (“The 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Protection of Human Rights”), Dissertation, 
(Law Faculty Graz, 2002), 5 et seq.  
55   See U 19/00, Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 27/01. 
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who did not accept the objective legal cleansing function of the individual 
application in the context of the appellate jurisdiction.  
This conflict between constitutionality and legality has not yet however 
resulted in an entity court insisting upon judgment based strictly on available 
legislation, so that renewed proceedings before the Constitutional Court 
would be necessary. As the ECHR is directly applicable by all organs and 
thereby also all courts and also enjoys legal priority, it could result that the 
lower courts in heeding the judgments of the Constitutional Court do not in 
practice apply the legislation inconsistent with the ECHR, even if such 
legislation had not been formally repealed! There have not however been 
investigations into this matter. Despite this, the judgments of the Human 
Rights Chamber experience a similar problem as the Chamber does not itself 
possess the competence to repeal legislation.   
The consequence of this situation from the view point of legal certainty is 
however two-fold. On the one hand, the process of conrete judicial review of 
Article VI. 3. c. is undermined through the continuation of such practice, as 
the lower courts instead of referring the case to the Constitutional Court for 
review proceedings simply do not apply legislation which is – in their opinion – 
not in conformity with the ECHR or the Constitution. As a result and in a 
comparative sense, it is possible to discern a hybrid mix between that of the 
US system of diffuse judicial review and that of the Austrian model of 
monopolised judicial review with a specialised court. The existence of some 
laws which would be formally have been nullified by the Constitutional Court 
alongside those which would not be applied by lower courts, even if they had 
not been subject to the final control of the Constitutional Court would lead to 
significantly enhanced legal uncertainty! On the other hand, no court has so 
far taken action under the concrete judicial review procedure of Article VI. 3. 
c. It was not until after a seminar organised by the Constitutional Court and 
the European Training Centre for Democracy and Human Rights at the 
University of Graz for judges and advocates in September 2000 that this very 
issue of the competences of the Court was expressly brought in the form of a 
referral before the Court by a Cantonal Court of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Despite this it was necessary to return the matter unanswered, 
as the crux of the question from referring court was simply how to decide the 
case on the merits! In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the 
Court itself is not empowered to grant advisory opinions, with the sole 
example of cases under Article VI. 3. c., in other words, in those matters 
relating to “the existence of or the scope of a general rule of public 
international law pertinent to the Court’s decision”, which may only really be 
imparted in the form of an opinion.  
4. Means of Interpretation and Elements of Constitutional 
Doctrine 
At this stage it is suitable to discuss the application of different means of 
interpretation and the development of elements of constitutional doctrine as 
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the background to the issue of the relationship between the Constitutional 
Court and the legislative, in particular, the constitutional law-making 
qualities of the Dayton Agreement which have been evident in the activities 
of the Court since its establishment.  
Shortly after the Court commenced its judicial functions in September 
1997, with the problem of admissibility of an application in case U1/98 of 
then “Co-chair” of the Council of Ministers, Haris Silajdzic, the issue of 
necessary interpretation in conformity with the Constitution was raised in 
light with the hierarchy of norms as established by the Dayton Constitution.
56 
Indeed, a Chair is foreseen by Article V. 4. of the Constitution, although on 
the basis of the ethnic distribution of the ministerial posts, it was intended in 
the Law on the Council of Ministers that not one Chair, but rather two Co-
Chairs exist who would chair meetings on a weekly rotating basis. This 
therefore begs the question in the concrete case whether one of the two Co-
Chairs on the basis of Article VI. 3. a. would be solely entitled to bring judicial 
review proceedings before the Constitutional Court or whether this should 
only be permissible upon joint application of both.  
Due to the fact that this case was eventually ‘decided’ with a close 5:4 
vote and that the reasoning contained a differentiation between on the one 
hand a ‘simple’ solution, i.e. an interpretation of the constitution on the basis 
of the statutory provisions applicable, and on the other, the fundamental 
principle of constitutional interpretation requiring functional conformity with 
the constitution, a significant proportion of the Court’s reasoning is cited here 
in full: 
.... Interpreting the Constitution on the basis of subconstitutional 
provisions can be seen as a variant of the principle of interpretation 
which requires conformity of all subconstitutional norms with the 
Constitution insofar as there is a legal hierarchy based on the 
supremacy clause of Article III. 3. (b) of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. From that follows the general principle of interpretation 
that all statutes under review are supposed to be in conformity with the 
Constitution as long as possible. However, this general principle of 
interpretation in reviewing the constitutional comformity of statutes 
has to be distinguished from the case before us insofar as there is no 
request to review the conformity of the Law of the Council of Ministers 
with the Constitution! On the contrary, the problem raised concerns the 
interpretation of the Constitution in light of the sub-constitutional 
statute which, however, in itself would reverse the legal hierarchy that 
has to be derived from Article III. 3. (b) of the Constitution.  
Moreover, from an interpretation that the two Co-Chairs must act 
jointly, it could follow that any access to the Constitutional Court by 
 
56   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 22/98. 
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the Chair of the Councel of Ministers may effectively be excluded if 
they block each other. Such an interpretation could thus have the effect 
that none of the two Co-Chairs can exercise this responsibility. This 
would violate the principle of effectiveness which is to be derived from 
the first sentence of Article VI. 3 of the Constitution of BiH that “the 
Constitutional Court shall uphold this Constitution.” 
Hence, if the principle of interpretation supposing conformity of sub-
constitutional norms with the constitution leads to unreasonable results 
or, in the case of this admissibility question, raises serious doubts about 
the conformity of the Law on the Council of Ministers with the 
Constitution of BiH - the review of which was, however, not requested 
by the applicant -, another principle, namely that of constitutional 
interpretation requiring functional conformity has to gain priority. The 
function of constitutional law is to provide a basic legal framework for 
living together in state and society. According to this function, 
constitutional law is formally characterized by its supremacy vis-à-vis 
statutes and other general legal norms and, usually, has to be amended 
in parliament by a qualified majority. It can be derived thus as a 
principle of interpretation that the function of the constitution must 
not be undermined by way of interpretation. In case of doubts, 
therefore, constitutional law must not be interpreted in such a way as 
to allow the “ordinary” legislature in actual effect to reach its goals 
without amendment of the constitution.
57 
Although the application of Haris Silajdzic was eventually withdrawn with the 
result that the Court could no longer decide on the merits in the case, one 
consequence of the doubt voiced in case U 1/98 as to the constitutionality of 
the Law on the Council of Minsters was that that very item of legislation was 
promptly challenged by other sources. The Court declared in case U 1/99
58 
that not only the post of Co-Chair as introduced on the basis of ethnic 
considerations, but also the post of Vice Prime Minister who would have the 
power to nominate ministers from ‘his’ own ethnic group – a situation clearly 
contrary to the wording and principles of the Constitution – were indeed 
unconstitutional.   
The Court’s decision in U 5/98
59 is one of the most significant cases for not 
only political reasons, but also for an understanding of the development of 
constitutional doctrine. The starting point for the case was the application by 
the then chairman of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, which called for 
examination of the constitutions of the entities in more than twenty issues, as 
 
57    See Ludwig K. Adamovich and Bernd-Christian Funk, Österreichisches  Verfassungsrecht (Vienna, 
New York, 3rd ed. 1985), 38. Despite this the relevant source as cited by the author of this article in 
the draft decision of the Court was not included in the published version of the decision.   
58   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 16/99. 
59   The Court’s decision was published in four parts, and appear in a series as Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 
11/00, br. 17/00, br. 23/00 and br. 36/00. 
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in his opinion, the entities had not sufficiently fulfilled their obligations under 
Article XII. 2. of the Constitution to bring their constitutions into line with the 
Dayton text within a time limit of six months. Perhaps the most politically 
sensitive issue was the allegation of the applicant that both Articles 1 of the 
entity constitutions – just as in the preamble to the RS Constitution which 
itself through reliance on a right to self-determination, contained a 
presumption of state sovereignty – was in no means in conformity to the 
preamble to the Dayton Constitution which provided a guarantee for all 
Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs as “constituent peoples” to equality within the 
entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this context, the provisions of 
the entity constitutions which not only declared Serbian as the sole official 
language in Republika Srpska, and which declared Bosnian and Croat as 
official languages of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but which also 
ensured a privileged role to the orthodox church were all subject to legal 
challenge. In addition, legal provisions which permitted the appointment of 
army officers by the relevant entity presidents, the appointment of 
diplomatic and consular staff, several paragraphs of the constitution of 
Republika Srpska regulating state and so-called socially owned property, the 
prohibition of extradition of citizens, the meaning of “granica” in the 
delineation of state borders, the human rights catalogue of the RS and, last 
but not least, an emergency clause which would permit the organs of RS to 
invoke unilateral measures “for the defence of the rights RS” were all 
challenged before the Court.  
It is unfortunately not appropriate at this point to enter into discussion on 
each of these individual points;
60 rather the most significant results in the 
development of constitutional doctrine shall be presented in overview. 
Even in relation to the extent to which the preamble of the Dayton 
Constitution could be applied as a standard of control, the representatives of 
the Parliament of Republika Srpska – in applying the theories of Hans Kelsen – 
argued that the preamble had no normative value; rather it was of a simple 
programmatical declaratory nature. In contrast, the plurality of the Court 
held that the preamble of the Dayton Constitution was indeed of a 
significantly normative character, in so far as it contained the normative 
principles and fundamental aims and values of the state as reflected in the 
rest of the constitutional provisions.
61 As such, the wording of the preamble 
 
60   Just as in the legal political discussion on the enforcement of the Court’s decision as in the relevant 
legal literature, on the basis of the strong ethnic and political context of the decisions, only the 
third partial decision on “constituent peoples” has really been taken notice of! See Carsten Stahn, 
“Die verfassungsrechtliche Pflicht zur Gleichstellung der drei ethnischen Volksgruppen in den 
bosnischen Teilrepubliken - Neue Hoffnung für das Friedensmodell von Dayton? Zugleich eine 
Anmerkung zur dritten Teilentscheidung des bosnischen Verfassungsgerichts vom 1. Juli 2000 im 
Izetbegovic-Fall”, in 60 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2000), 
663-696 and Sarcevic, “Verfassungsgebung und ‘konstitutives Volk’ …”, esp. 501 et seq. 
61   This is not however evident in the concurring opinion of Judge Danelius: Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 
23/00, point II. As for the matter of the acceptance of the decisions if, as in this case, a very close 
vote amongst the judges results 5:4 yet one of the judges then by means of a concurring opinion 
does not share the same reasoning, see section 5. of this article.  
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“… to promote the general welfare and economic growth through the 
production of private property and the promotion of a market economy” and 
in particular the provisions of Article I. 4. of the Constitution which lays down 
the “full freedom of movement of persons, goods, services and capital 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina” was applied and as a result the remaining 
legislative provisions relating to socially owned property which originated in 
the self-governing communist systems were declared to be unconstitutional. 
This was justified on the basis that in the process of privatisation, such 
provisions hindered the development of a market economy as expressly 
contained within the preamble to the Constitution.  
Furthermore, the issue was raised in relation to the interpretation of 
human rights, and the extent to which they were to be regarded as classic 
negative rights or indeed as those of a more normative and positive nature. 
This matter has been raised in the context of Article 1 of the First Optional 
Protocol to the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, which protects only existing private property rather than the 
possibility of its acquisition, in so far as a right to property in accordance of 
Article II. 3. k. of the Constitution has not solely been interpreted by the 
majority of the bench as a subjective negative right, but also – in particular in 
the context of judicial review proceedings – as an institutional guarantee.
62   
Moreover and in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the Court, 
the human rights provisions are interpreted as a source of positive legal 
obligations.  
Perhaps the most significant element in the re-construction of Bosnia is the 
issue of returning refugees. Article II. 5. of the Constitution provides not only 
a special right to return for refugees and internally displaced persons, but 
also a right to restitution of property. Of particular significance in this context 
is the expressis verbis reference to Annex 7 which contains a series of positive 
obligations to protect and act in the form of affirmative action measures. In 
accordance with Article I. 3. and the general duty to protect, “the Parties 
shall take all necessary steps to prevent activities within their territories 
which would hinder or impede the safe and voluntary return of refugees and 
displaced persons”, through the following means:  
(a) the repeal of domestic legislation and administrative practices with 
discriminatory intent or effect 
(b) the prevention and prompt suppression of any written or verbal 
incitement, through the media or otherwise, of ethnic or religious 
hostility or hatred; 
 
62   Cf. the dissenting opinion of Judge Danelius in Službeni glasnik, br. 17/00, esp. 375.  
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(c)  ...the prompt suppression of acts of retribution by military, 
paramilitary, and police services, and by other public officials or private 
individuals;... 
In addition, Article II. 1. lays down that “the Parties undertake to create in 
their territories the political, economic and social conditions conducive to the 
voluntary return and harmonious reintegration of refugees and displaced 
persons, without preference for any particular group.” This represents not 
only one of the fundamental aims and values for the return to a multi-ethnic 
society as had existed before conflict began in 1992: it must also be 
understood as a fundamental positive duty to be fulfilled by the legislative.   
It is particularly significant in this context to discuss the term ‘framework 
legislation’. The Dayton Constitution itself contains no reference to this term. 
The expression was used for the first time in a decision by the High 
Representative, Carlos Westendorp. in the context of privatisation,
63 but is 
only now becoming applied by the Constitutional Court in order to establish a 
clear constitutional basis for economical integration and thereby the integrity 
of the state. This appears in both the second and fourth partial decisions in 
case U 5/98: contrary to the opinion of the RS representatives, that all 
matters not expressly enumerated in Article III. 1. of the Constitution 
automatically fall to the sole competence of the entities, the Court initially 
determined through systematic interpretation in the second partial decision 
that the organs of the state as a whole are indeed endowed with other powers 
a n d  i n  d o i n g  s o  r e l i e d  u p o n  t h e  c a t a l o g u e  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s :  “ A r t i c l e  I I .  3 .  
therefore gives a general competence to the common institutions of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to regulate all matters enumerated in the catalogue of 
human rights which cannot exclusively be left to the Entities since the 
protection has to be guaranteed to ‘all persons within the territory of BiH’”.
64   
The elements of Article I. 4. of the Constitution which provide for the 
freedom of the person, of goods, of services and of capital for the whole of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and which prohibit the entities from limitation of such 
were also interpreted in this manner. It is hence on the basis of these 
competences that the basis for affirmative duties is founded. The Court went 
o n  t o  c o m m e n t  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  s u c h  p r o v i s i o n s  t h a t  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  a  
functioning market economy based on these four fundamental freedoms and 
the institutional guarantee of private property,
65 that not only the state as a 
whole, but also the entities are responsible for the maintenance of the 
relevant legal framework which will reflect such constitutional duties. The 
Court also specified that as a result, the national parliament of the state as a 
whole is obliged to establish through the means of framework legislation the 
 
63   See Framework Law on Privatisation of Enterprises and Banks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Službeni 
glasnik BiH, br. 14/98.   
64   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 17/00, para. 13.  
65   It is in this context that the first reference to the “Wesensgehaltstheorie” was made.  
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minimum standards for a unified civil private law for Bosnia and Herzegovina
66 
which will provide the basis upon which the entity legislatures are obliged to 
develop their own concurrent provisions - after having had disintegrating 
effects so far.
67   
A further example is the legislative duty contained within the fourth partial 
decision in the case U 5/98 in relation to the introduction of Serbian, Bosnian 
and Croatian as the sole official languages of the relevant entities as 
compared to the clear guarantee of the minimum standard of protection for 
the languages of the other constituent peoples and minorities through the 
means of framework legislation of the state. In this sense, the Court even 
describes in great detail how the different levels of protection provided by 
the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages are to be 
incorporated into suitable framework legislation.
68 
5. Position of the Judges, Organisational Issues and Proceedings 
As part of the background to a deep ethnic segregation of society and the 
institutional concretisation of the notion of ethnic proportionality within the 
Dayton Constitution for the legislative and executive as a means of 
compromise through power-sharing in the model of consociational democracy, 
the question arises just how justice and in particular the Constitutional Court 
can be ethnically neutral so as to effectively uphold the rule of impartiality. 
This can be illustrated through the example of Switzerland and the Article 188 
(4) of the 1999 Consititution of Switzerland which states clearly that the 
interests of impartiality of justice and consideration of the balance of the 
linguistic groups in the composition of the state Supreme Court must not come 
into conflict.   
It is evident from the composition of the highest state organs that the 
creators of the Dayton Constitution explicitly intended an ethnic quota system 
for the Presidency, the higher chamber of parliament, the House of Peoples 
and the government, whilst the six national judges of the Court are to be 
elected by the entity parliaments on a basis of 2:1 without any reference to 
ethnic considerations. Due also to that fact however that the entities regard 
themselves as ‘national states’ of their constituent peoples, it must also have 
been clear to the drafters of the Dayton Constitution that the parliaments 
would only elect judges from their own constituent people, with the de facto 
result that there would each be elected two judges who considered 
themselves representatives of either the Bosniacs, Croats or Serbs. It must 
also have been the intention of the drafters of the Dayton Constitution to 
balance such ethnic parity with a further three international judges.  
 
66   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 17/00, paras. 14 and 29.   
67    The constitution of Republika Srpska did however retain the notion stemming from the former 
communist system of socially owned property, which was nevertheless declared by the Court to be 
unconstitutional.   
68   Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 36/00, para. 34.  
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It can be seen from the Rules of Procedure
69 as provided for by Article VI. 
2. b of the Constitution that the Court is itself not entirely free from ethnic 
considerations. As a result of the need to establish the decision-making 
capabilities of the Court in the shortest time possible, the drafting and 
acceptance process of the Rules of Procedure
70 ended in a compromise.  
As such, the Serbian and Croat judges finally accepted not only Sarajevo as 
the seat for the Court, but also the rapid election of the first President of the 
Court, after the concept of ethnic parity and rotation between the three 
constituent peoples for this position and the election of three vice presidents 
had been accepted in the provisions of Articles 83 and 86 of the Rules of 
Procedure.
71 In addition a form of ‘delaying veto’ had to be accepted. Article 
37 (2) of the Rules of Procedure provides that at least one judge from each 
constituent people must participate in the voting process, otherwise the 
meeting is to be re-scheduled. Despite this, a vote may be taken in the 
following meeting if the same judge once again is absent without 
justification. Paragraph 3 of that provision states an exception to this rule in 
those cases in which an application is dismissed or which concern matters 
which are not directly related to the constituent people which that judge may 
represent. This has however only de facto occurred twice in the case of U 
5/98 which lasted for two years and which directly concerned the legal 
position of the constituent peoples and their members.  
In contrast to the Presidency and the Parliament which for years were 
paralysed for reasons of ethnic conflict,
72 so that the High Representative was 
required to assume the role of legislator, the continuous functioning of the 
Constitutional Court since commencing its mandate with the constitutive 
session in May 1997 must be regarded as a great success. At no time in its 
period of operation has the Court found itself blocked along ethnic conflict 
lines, even though in the afore-mentioned case U 5/98 there was tension 
evident between the judges and that the ethno-political pressure on the 
national judges did appear to be immense.
73   
If one is to examine the voting behaviour of the judges from this point of 
view, certain conclusions are inevitable: there has never in any session of 
voting occurred a long-term formation of ethnic coalitions. Even in the unique 
case of U 5/98 which produced four partial decisions, the voting behaviour of 
 
69   The most recent version of the text of the rules of procedure may be found at Službeni glasnik BiH, 
br. 24/99.  
70   The activities of the Court are based upon the few provisions of the constitution and procedural 
rules which required at the time of drafting a minimal consensus and in which there are however a 
few gaps in legal protection. There is no constitutional law on the overall national level which 
regulates the organisation and procedure of the Court in further detail.   
71   The compromise was such that the three international judges would avoid election as President of 
the Court, yet on the basis of internal financial controls may participate in the rotation system for 
the post of Vice President. 
72   The Parliament for example only approved some 30 items of legislation between 1996 and 2000.   
73   One of the Croatian judges complained with great pathos the extent to which he had been “od 
generala do kardinala”, placed under pressure.  
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not only the local but also the international judges tended to be subject to 
frequent change.
74 Despite this there does appear to have developed a certain 
trend in the variously motivated judicial voting patterns between on the one 
hand, the appellate functions carried out by the Court and on the other, the 
determination of the constitutionality of legislation. In those cases relating to 
individual applications and complaints there was almost always a unanimous 
decision amongst the judges, as all judges generally took the effort to ensure 
from a procedural viewpoint that the individual will come as far as possible in 
their application. In this context, the considerations of ethnic representation 
are as good as meaningless; rather there has developed out of the awareness 
of competition with the Human Rights Chamber a certain sense of corps 
d’esprit to ensure far-reaching human rights protection and to not only 
enforce but also develop the application of the ECHR and the decisions of the 
Strasbourg organs.
75 In cases of judicial review of legislation on the other 
hand, the national judges appear to act as representatives of their constituent 
group of the population. In particular the Serbian judges attempted in this 
sense to ‘defend’ the constitution and legislation of Republika Srpska in a 
manner which to a lesser extent had also been deployed by the Bosniac and 
Croat judges in relation to the Federation.   
Article 93 of the Rules of Procedure regulates the issue of judicial 
independence: in accordance with that section, a judge may not be a member 
of a political party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor member of a legislative, 
executive nor law enforcement body. In addition, any other function which 
could affect the impartiality of the judge is decreed not in agreement with a 
judicial post. Doubts on judicial independence on the basis of an obvious 
conflict of interests arose in the case of contemporaneous membership of one 
of the national judges of the Court with the Human Rights Chamber and the 
Commission of Arbitration on the territorial status of Brcko, yet neither the 
Human Rights Chamber nor the Court officially confirmed such doubts. 
Furthermore, the un-regulated independence of the legal advisors to the 
Court has been proven to be particularly problematic. In one case, a legal 
advisor to the Court also held the post of deputy prosecutor of Republika 
Srpska which – in the sense of ECHR case law
76 – would in the least cast doubt 
on the impartiality of the Constitutional Court. A further deficit is the lack of 
an explicit provision on economic independence. As such all judges – not only 
those of the Constitutional Court – are forced, a result of the economic 
 
74   In this sense the politically motivated stories in the media that two peoples were outvoted are quite 
wrong and can be traced to the fact that case U 5/98 has been understood not in its entirety, rather 
only in the context of the third partial decision.  
75   See also Kasim I. Begić, “Ustavnopravni okvir zastite ljudskih prava u Bosni i Hercegovini” (“The 
Constitutional Framework for the Protection of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina”), in Drzava 
BiH i ljudska prava (Sarajevo, 1999), 23–29; Snježana Savić, “Demokratija i ljudska prava u Bosni i 
Hercegovini” (“Democracy and Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina”), 9 Pravni savjetnik 
(2001), 85–89.   
76   See the equitable maxim: “justice must not only be done; it must also be seen to be done”. See 
Jochen Frowein and Wolfgang Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, EMRK Kommentar 
(Kehl, 2nd ed. 1996), 251.  
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situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to seek out other sources of income: a 
situation which opens its doors wide to ethnically dominated corruption. For 
judges of the Constitutional Court this situation is somewhat enhanced, 
insofar as four of the six national members of the bench are also 
simultaneously members of the national law faculties. Thus for those newly 
appointed judges at the end of the five-year mandate of the current bench 
and the consequently necessary switch to life as a career judge the problem 
of economic independence will be particularly critical.   
Article 89 of the Rules of Procedure regulates any potential conflicts of 
interest and disqualification from office: if one of the judges has a personal 
interest in the case, if they have participated in the same case at an earlier 
stage as judge, advocate or party or if other relevant circumstances exist 
which lead to doubt on the impartiality of the individual, they may be 
disqualified from hearing the case at hand. In this context it has occurred that 
national judges have declared their interests in cases on the basis of 
participation in a lower court or personal links to the parties. On the other 
hand the tool of disqualification from the case has also been employed twice 
as a political instrument so as to influence the overall majority of the Court. 
On application of the representative of the Parliament of Republika Srpska 
the judge rapporteur in case U 5/98 was accused
77 of partiality, since he had 
served as legal expert of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe by 
contributing to a report on the inter-relationship of the entity constitutions 
with the Dayton Constitution in Summer 1996 – almost one year before the 
commencement of the mandate of the Court and even though in the 
proceedings of the same case the exclusion of the judge was unanimously 
dismissed.
78 Even one of the Bosniac judges was at a further stage of the 
proceedings accused of having been one of the legal advisors at the Dayton 
negotiations and hence as being unimpartial. In this case too the exclusion of 
the judge was rejected with an overwhelming majority.   
The more or less ‘voluntary’ resignation from the same case of one of the 
two Serbian judges had the end effect of a particularly problematic political 
manoeuvre. In order to avoid the aforementioned suspensory veto or indeed 
also any conflict on the exact interpretation of this provision of the Rules of 
Procedure, a preemptory decision was rendered at an early stage to the 
effect that judgement will only be passed in case U 5/98 in the presence of 
all nine judges. As such, when it became clear that the proceedings would 
result in a 5:4 majority decision that the preamble and Article 1 of the 
Constitution of Republika Srpska and the Constitution of the Federation were 
unconstitutional, the Serbian judge who had no other source of income than 
the Court stood down ‘voluntarily’. It took six months for the Parliament of 
Republika Srpska to appoint a successor judge, with the consequence that 
 
77   The author of this article.  
78   See also the additional personal accusations in the dissenting opinions of judges Vitomir Popovic and 
Mirko Zovko in Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 23/00, esp. 504 et seq. and 513 et seq.  
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during that time the case was discussed in Court, but no further voting took 
place.   
Alongside such and six months after the constitutive session of the Court, 
one of the Bosniac judges was forced after exclusionary proceedings to stand 
down after having in journalistic interviews referred to pending legal 
proceedings in which he publicly rendered his own personal opinion. Towards 
the end of 2001 a case arose under similar facts in that an application was 
made to exclude one of the two Serbian judges yet was however for reasons 
of opportunism eventually retracted.  
In the context of the pro and contra of the publication of dissenting 
opinions the issue once again arises of the relationship of the judges to 
general public opinion.   
It should firstly be generally stated that summa summarum the possibility 
foreseen by Article 36 of the Rules of Procedure, in that dissenting and 
concurring opinions are to be published, has indeed had an overall positive 
effect on the Court.  
It should be emphasised that the particularly positive aspect of the 
situation is that the anticipation of dissent leads to the majority taking 
special care in argumentation and thereby also to an improvement in the 
quality of the reasoning of the decision. This also works in reverse in that 
there is no great effort involved in the preparation of a dissenting opinion, as 
in the proceedings the opposing positions to the majority are clearly tackled 
by the complexity of the argumentation and hence – generally – the dissenting 
opinions may be put together relatively quickly so that the duration of the 
proceedings are in no way significantly affected.
79   
On the one hand, the legal-political conflicts amongst the members of the 
bench are played out with the possibility of a dissenting opinion resulting, 
although this does not tend to enhance the conflict; rather it acts as an 
instrument to let feelings vent and to release burdens along the lines of the 
ethnic composition of the Court as the judges who consider themselves 
representatives of their constituent peoples can prove to their ‘clients’ that 
they indeed have been ‘defending the national interest’, have given their 
‘best’, yet that they have been subject to the ‘fate’ of the voting procedures.  
Furthermore the values and various styles of judicial reasoning of the 
individual judges have become clearer with the result that transparency of 
judicial proceedings has become greater. This transparance prevents 
speculation on the formation of fractions or possible political tendencies 
amongst the judges. The notion of judicial independence together with the 
 
79   Despite this, the problem has arisen in some cases that dissenting opinions have been produced 
under the pretext of delaying publication by several months of the decision in the Official Journal, 
such as those in cases U 9/00 and U 25/00.  
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authority of the Court is however not endangered through transparency of the 
voting procedures. In so far as opposing positions are visible for the parties to 
the case and the general public, so split decisions of the Court are met with a 
greater acceptance.  
Of course, in the context of dissenting opinions, judges may experience 
personally unpleasant consequences particularly when matters depart from 
the level of factual criticism as in the aforementioned proceedings on the 
exclusion of judges. In general, however, this tends to be more a conflict of 
individuals. For the Court itself as an institution, a non-factual criticism 
within a dissenting opinion could detract from the legitimacy of the Court, 
but even in such a case for the actual judges this serves as a form of 
boomerang. It does however become problematic when individual judges give 
media interviews and utilise television appearances as a means not of 
explaining the reasoning of the majority of the bench but rather of presenting 
their own dissenting opinion as ‘the’ final decision of the Court.
80 
Even if in some decisions with a close 5:4 majority vote such as U 5/98 
some four dissenting but also one concurring opinion is rendered, this form of 
‘plurality vote’ remains difficult for the general public to comprehend and 
leaves it open for the ‘over-ruled’ minority to claim that they were in reality 
in the majority. Should this not only be widely discussed in camera but also in 
public, it is likely to lead to a lack of legitimacy for a decision. This did not 
however occur in the case at hand, as not only the entire international 
community, but also the majority of the population of the Federation in fact 
welcomed the Court’s decision.   
6. Concluding Remarks 
The issue of the relationship between the legislative and the Constitutional 
Court and thereby also the demarcation between politics and law is – just as 
the drama of the recent decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court in 
relation to the erection of bi-lingual street signs – even in a mature 
parliamentary democracy with a decades long tradition of constitutionality 
not entirely free of conflict. Even greater are nevertheless the problems of 
comprehension over the necessity and means of operation of constitutional 
justice in a young state, which has not only experienced over several years 
the effects of conflict with elements of civil war, but where the 
transformation of its entire political, economic and cultural system from that 
of communist monism to that of a pluralistic, non-ethnocratic multiparty 
democracy on the basis of a civil society has just begun.   
 
80   See for example the interview in the weekly publication Reporter from 1 May 2001 under the title 
“Nevjesto napisan pamflet” or the interview in Glas Srpski published on the occasion of the tenth 
anniversary of the passing of the constitution of Republika Srpska, 19-20 January 2002 entitled “Za 
unitarizaciju BiH”.  
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As for the role of constitutional justice in this context it is clear that the 
Constitution as Annex 4 to the Dayton Agreement has indeed fulfilled its aims 
of stabising the cease-fire and thereby also the precarious ‘negative’ peace. It 
is and remains questionable whether the Constitution would also stand up to a 
consolidation of the state itself. The Constitution is as a result of its 
fundamental antinomy
81 wedged between on the one side the democratic 
state and rule of law, and on the other the entrenchment of ethnocratic 
structures which, despite massive in-roads made by the international 
community and in particular the OSCE and their efforts in relation to 
elections, has so far prevented the development of a multi-ethnic party 
system. On the contrary: as a result of the almost annual elections held since 
1996,
82 the mechanisms of ethnic representation as foreseen by the 
Constitution have rather become a firm part of society.  
It was with this background that the Court in the case U 5/98 was faced 
with the fundamental issue of deciding to either on the one hand maintain the 
political compromise – which emerged as the price for the ceasefire – through 
the means of historical interpretation and reliance on the will of the 
contracting parties and effects of the compromise on the ethnic 
homogenisation by means of institutional and territorial separation, or on the 
other, to break up the allegedly intact connex of territory and ethnicity of the 
entities and thereby go against the ethnocratic developments yet in doing so 
to strengthen the infrastructure of the state. This was indeed attempted – as 
described above – through the means of an interpretation of the institutional 
structure of the Constitution, the re-orientation from an exclusive to a 
competing distribution of powers and the inclusive framework legislation of 
the entire state, legislative affirmative duties and lastly the strong emphasis 
on individual rights and a ban on discrimination for the return of refugees. As 
the boundary of constitutional justice is the clear wording of the Constitution 
itself, it was and remains impossible on the basis of the Dayton Constitution 
to find an alternative between ethnically structured concosiational democracy 
and an ethnically indifferent democratic state based on the rule of law in the 
form of a strict separation of state, law and ethnicity.
83 With such a judgment 
the weighting was firstly merely transferred from the heavily dominated 
ethnic principle to that of an ethnically indifferent equality of citizens, and 
secondly it was attempted to strengthen the overall ability of the state to 
integrate. Even if the tight majority of the bench are accused by their 
 
81   See for example to pregnant analysis by Sarcevic, “Verfassunggebung und ‘konstitutives Volk’ …”, 
esp. 524 et seq.; and even Joseph Marko, “Bosnia and Herzegovina – Multi-ethnic or multi-
national?”, in European Commission for Democracy through Law (ed.), Societies in Conflict: the 
Contribution of Law and Democracy in Conflict Resolution (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2000), 
92-118.  
82   See Marko, “Friedenssicherung im 21. Jahrhundert …”, 70 et seq.  
83   In relation to this, Sarcevic, “Verfassungsgebung und ‘konstitutives Volk’ …”, 531 sees the Dayton 
Constitution only as a provisory document and concludes that only as a result of a newly formed, 
democratic constitution based on the rule of law will Bosnia and Herzegovina see a real chance for 
change. Apart from the fact that it would re-open a Pandora’s box, the main issue would however 
be the specific institutional combination of rule of law with a multi-ethnic democracy: matters 
which are unavoidable in Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
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colleagues within their dissenting opinions to have over-stepped the 
boundaries between law and politics and in doing so making themselves into 
members of the legislative, the identity of the state and law and therefore 
also the Constitution as a legal basis of the state make clear that it cannot be 
the purpose of a constitution and thereby also the task of a constitutional 
court to participate in a disintegration through the means of segregation and 
as a result in the dissolution of a state.   
In conclusion the Constitutional Court as perhaps the most effective 
institution on the entire national level has in its five-year history attempted 
to fulfil three essential functions: to establish a constitutional balance 
between democracy and ethnocracy; to develop alongside the international 
control wielded by the High Representative a democratic system of checks 
and balances and finally to ensure by means of its appellate jurisdiction the 
effective protection of human rights.   
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